Negative Databases for Biometric Data by Bringer, Julien & Chabanne, Hervé
ar
X
iv
:1
00
5.
11
94
v2
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
0 M
ay
 20
10
Negative Databases for Biometric Data
Julien Bringer1 and Herve´ Chabanne1,2
1 Sagem Se´curite´, France.
2 Te´le´com ParisTech, France.
November 11, 2018
Abstract
Negative databases – negative representations of a set of data – have
been introduced in 2004 to protect the data they contain. Today, no
solution is known to constitute biometric negative databases. This is
surprising as biometric applications are very demanding of such protection
for privacy reasons. The main difficulty comes from the fact that biometric
captures of the same trait give different results and comparisons of the
stored reference with the fresh captured biometric data has to take into
account this variability. In this paper, we give a first answer to this
problem by exhibiting a way to create and exploit biometric negative
databases.
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1 Introduction
Biometric data must be protected in order to prevent someone to be able to
track back the users of a biometric system. Recently, they have been a lot of
researches on their storage in a way which is renewable and which does not
leak information. Typically, biometric data are quantized and encrypted. This
encryption must still permit the matching of the underlying biometric data
without decrypting them. On one hand, some very simple techniques of encryp-
tion, known as secure sketches have been suggested [10, 19] but their resistance
seems doubtful in practice [2, 20]. On the other hand, secure sketches can be
combined with homomorphic encryption but in this case, the performances of
the computations are penalized [1, 5, 21].
In this paper, we have a different approach following the one of the negative
databases [12]. In a negative database, instead of having the elements of a
databaseDB, we consider the complementary DB of these elements. This means
that instead of checking whether b ∈ DB, we have to equivalently verify that
b /∈ DB. The representation of negative databases is made possible thanks to
a wild-card symbol ∗ which stands for all the values; for instance, as we are
here going to work with binary vectors, a ∗ for a bit means either the value 0
1
or 1. Negative databases got very interesting properties. Firstly, for a given
database DB, different negative databases DB can be established. Moreover,
starting from DB, it is hard to retrieve DB. Finally, relational algebra also
exists for negative databases. It should be noted that our approach is different
from the previous one which treats biometric data individually while we are
here considering a database as a whole.
The difficulty we encounter is that each capture of the same biometric data
gives a different value. We here consider binarized biometric data, i.e. b stands
for a binary vector representing a biometric trait. A new capture of this bio-
metric trait will give a binary vector with numerous coordinates differing from
the ones of b. Our approach follows the one described in for identifying people
thanks to their iris [16]. We here how show to handle this problem.
We begin in Section 2 by recalling some works on the binarization of biomet-
ric data. We state the properties these binarized data have to fulfill for the rest
of our work. In Section 3, we give a short introduction to negative databases.
Section 4 constitutes the core of our proposal and explains how to create and
use biometric negative databases. We give an example to gauge the efficiency of
our solution when applied to a real-life case. And finally, Section 6 concludes.
We conclude this introduction by recalling some basic facts about biometric
data. A reader, familiar with this topic, can skip it to go directly to Section 2.
1.1 Biometric Systems: 101
Biometric recognition techniques can lead to quite different applications than
those which are possible when you are dealing with, for instance, passwords.
A major difference comes from the fact that your biometric data enable to
identify yourself among a large set of people during your whole lifetime. This
characteristic is reinforced by the fact that biometric data are non-transferable
to someone else. On one hand, a positive aspect is that this can been seen as
a very natural and easy-to-deploy way of identifying populations (think at the
census of the citizens of a country). On the other hand, biometric data must
be protected to respect their privacy. Today, AFIS (Automated Fingerprint
Identification System) are present in many countries worldwide for police or civil
applications. These AFIS can gather together the biometric data of millions of
users. Usually, for measuring their performances, we evaluate their accuracy in
terms of FAR (False Acceptance Rate: the probability that the system rejects
a genuine user) and FRR (False Reject Rate: the probability that the system
accepts an impostor). These 2 rates FAR and FRR cannot be reduced both
at the same time and some compromise must be found according your wish to
favour security or comfort. In this paper, we are looking at biometric systems
of smaller scale. Typically, we are considering biometric readers mainly used
for restricting the access control to a building or a room. The need for storage
of biometric data is then limited to less than one hundred records.
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2 Binarization of Biometric Data
Let β designate the biometric trait of an user. Let b← β indicate that the value
b has been captured by a sensor.
We here make the hypothesis that the biometric b are quantized and can be
presented as binary vectors of length n, b ∈ {0, 1}n in such a way that:
Condition 1 1. Two different captures b, b′ from the same user U are with
high probability at a Hamming distance d(b, b′) ≤ λmin.
2. Captures b1, b2 of different users U1,U2 are at a Hamming distance d(b1, b2) >
λmax.
The origin of Condition 1 comes from iris recognition technology [8] where
the concept of iriscodes has been introduced. Iriscodes are binary vectors of
length n = 2048 where the features of iris are represented. They are compared
by their Hamming distance. Following this, various attempts have been made
for applying this kind of representations to fingerprints [3,18] or faces as in [6].
Condition 1 has been exploited in [16] for an efficient search algorithm over a
large database. With a high probability the vectors we are comparing will have
many small portions of their coordinates equal whenever they come from the
same user as they are close for the Hamming distance. Let DB = {b1, . . . , bN}.
[16] uses h1, . . . , h128, projections of binary vectors (here iriscodes) over a part
of their coordinates. They consider that a freshly captured iris b can match an
element stored in DB whenever:
hj1(b) = hj1(bk), hj2(b) = hj2(bk), hj3(b) = hj3(bk) (1)
for 1 ≤ j1 < j2 < j3 ≤ 128 and 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
We here skip the details. This way of proceeding will serve us as the basis of
our work on biometric negative databases which is described in Section 4. We
recall a definition that formalizes this notion and which has been introduced for
approximate nearest neighbor search:
Definition 1 (Locality-Sensitive Hashing, [17]) Let (E, d) be the Hamming
space, F be a set, r1, r2 ∈ R with r1 < r2, p1, p2 ∈ [0, 1] with p1 > p2. Let
H = {h1, . . . , hL} be a family of functions hi : E → F .
The family H is (r1, r2, p1, p2)-LSH, if
∀x, x′ ∈ E
{
Prh∈H[h(x) = h(x
′) | d(x, x′) < r1] > p1
Prh∈H[h(x) = h(x
′) | d(x, x′) > r2] < p2
In the sequel we will assume that the inequalities above are equalities, i.e.
the first (resp. second) probability is equal to p1 (resp. p2). This holds for the
hash constructions used by [16].
In practice, we apply Condition 1 to a family of Locality-Sensitive Hashing
functions that are combined to obtain the following result:
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Proposition 1 Let the family H = {h1, . . . , hL} be a (λmin, λmax, p1, p2)-LSH
family. Let m be the number of hash functions that we consider simultaneously,
following the principle of Equation (1).
The probability not to output ‘matching’ for a genuine user – called False
Reject Rate (FRR) – is approximately
Pfr =
m−1∑
i=0
(
L
i
)
pi1 (1− p1)
L−i
and the probability to output ‘matching’ for an impostor – called False Accept
Rate (FAR) – is approximately
Pfa =
L∑
i=m
(
L
i
)
pi2(1− p2)
L−i.
The variable m is called order of the hash equalities in the sequel.
Proof. Let b1, b2 be two different biometric captures (possibly coming from
the same user). They are considered as a matching pair as soon there is at least
m functions hi1 , . . . , him from H such that
hi1(b1) = hi1(b2), . . . , him(b1) = him(b2).
As H is (λmin, λmax, p1, p2)-LSH, from Condition 1, we know that with a
high probability Prh∈H[h(b1) = h(b2)] = p1 if b1, b2 come from the same user
and Prh∈H[h(b1) = h(b2)] = p2 if they come from different users. ✷
3 Negative Databases
A negative database consists of the representation of the negative image of a
given database. The goal is to represent all the elements not in the original
database instead of storing explicitly the data itself. The main issue is to find a
way to represent concisely the negative database without letting the possibility
to retrieve easily the original records. Note that there exists an extended notion
of negative database where almost all elements not in the original database are
represented. In this section, we refer only to the first notion for which the
definition – inspired by by Esponda et al. [12] and subsequent works – follows.
Definition 2 Let DB be a database containing N vectors. Let l denote the
length of the binary vectors belonging to DB. A negative database DB of DB is
a finite set of vectors such that
• there is an algorithm IsMember
DB
enabling to check efficiently whether one
l bits string is a member of DB;
• x ∈ {0, 1}l is an element represented by DB if and only if x 6∈ DB, i.e.
that DB represents {0, 1}l −DB.
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If l is large, then the number of elements represented by DB could be huge.
To achieve a compact representation, [14] introduced the wild-card symbol ’∗’,
with the classical role: a position set to ∗ in a string represents both 0 and 1
values. This doing a negative database is composed of vectors of length l with
the alphabet {0, 1, ∗}. The associated IsMember
DB
algorithm corresponds to
the string matching algorithm; a element x is a member if DB contains a vector
y for which simultaneous binary valued positions of x and y should be equal:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, (xi = yi OR xi = ∗ OR yi = ∗).
Several polynomial-time algorithms have been published for negative databases
computation [7, 9, 13] with quite different techniques. We recall in Table 1 the
algorithm introduced in [12] to compute a negative representation of a database
thanks to the prefix method. wi will stand in the following to a prefix of length
i and Wi will represent the set of vectors of length i (a part of the wi’s).
1. i← 0
2. Wi ← {}
3. W(i+1) ← set of vectors of length i+1 with a prefix of length i in Wi
which is not a prefix of an element of DB
4. for all x in Wi+1
5. output a vector y with x as a prefix and complete it with ∗’s up to
length l
6. add to DB
7. i← i+ 1
8. Wi ← set of prefixes of length i in DB
9. go back to step 3 while i < l
Table 1: Prefix algorithm for negative representation
As proved in [14], the prefix algorithm outputs a negative database in lN
time (where N is the number of records of DB) and the resulting negative
database will have at most lN entries (elements of {0, 1, ∗}l). This leads for DB
to an overall size (2×N × l2).
The prefix algorithm shows the feasibility of negative representation. As for
security concerns, [14] demonstrated that the reconstruction of DB from such
a negative database with alphabet {0, 1, ∗} is NP-hard, based on reduction to
3-SAT problem. Concerning the way to construct hard instances which resist
to SAT solvers, the known algorithms produce negative representations with
different level of security, depending for example on the number of ∗’s used.
See [9, 13] for solutions on how to generate such hard instances. One another
interesting property is the capability to create several different randomized neg-
ative representations from the same DB.
To obtain randomized representation, [13] suggests a non deterministic ver-
sion of the prefix algorithm based on:
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• the use of random permutation to include the wild-card symbol also at
the beginning or in the middle of a vector;
• a random replacement of wild-card by both the values 0 and 1.
The resulting algorithm is designed to run in time l2N2 and produces negative
databases of size 2×N × l3.
From a given negative database, it is even possible to transform it into a new
negative representation which is the negative image of the same database, but
for which the two negative databases are different and it is difficult to determine
if they are equivalent. In [11], this operation is denoted Morph.
Together with the creation of a negative representation, specific operations
on DB are translated in operations applied on DB. Inserting (resp. deleting)
a string into (resp. from) DB corresponds to remove (resp. insert) the corre-
sponding binary strings from (resp. into) DB. As for the creation algorithm,
randomized operations are also available [12]. Then an alternative solution for
creating randomized representation is to start with a randomized negative rep-
resentation of the empty set and to delete the data corresponding to DB.
As remarked by [13], using these operations many times may have the effect
on the size of DB to grow unreasonably. An algorithm, somehow to clean
regularly the representation, is designed to control this bad effect (cf. Clean-Up
algorithm [13]).
Moreover, more complex operations are designed in [15] in the field of rela-
tional algebra operators (equality, less-than, union, cartesian product, intersec-
tion, . . .). Each operator on DB has its transposition as an negative operator
on DB.
Note that several other techniques are analyzed in the literature. For in-
stance [7] introduced a negative representation with an higher overall growth
factor but for which the security relies on cryptographic hash properties.
4 Our Solution
We explain now how to manage biometric data via negative representation in
order to protect the content of the enrollment database. The main motiva-
tion is authorization scenario, nonetheless our construction can also be used for
authentication.
4.1 Biometric Negative Database
We recall that our database DB = {b1, . . . , bN}. Let H = {h1, . . . , hL} be
(λmin, λmax, p1, p2)-LSH family of functions as defined in Definition 1 Section
2. Let m be the order of the hash equalities, i.e. the number of these functions
we are using as in Prop. 1. We are now ready to define the biometric negative
database DB.
For 1 ≤ k ≤ N , let DBbk be the database made of the elements
j1|| . . . ||jm||hj1(bk)|| . . . ||hjm(bk) (2)
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with 1 ≤ j1 < . . . < jm ≤ L and where || stands for the concatenation.
Definition 3 An (H,m,DB)-biometric negative database DB is a negative rep-
resentation of the dataset U =
⋃N
k=1DBbk which is made of all order m hash
chains obtained with respect to DB and the LSH family H (cf. Equation (2)).
The algorithm to determine if one fresh capture b′ is close to one enrolled tem-
plate within the original dataset DB via one of its biometric negative database
DB is explained by Table 2.
Input: fresh biometric template b′
1. result← OK
2. For all 1 ≤ j1 < . . . < jm ≤ L
3. z ← j1|| . . . ||jm||hj1 (b
′)|| . . . ||hjm (b
′)
4. If IsMember
DB
(z) = OK
5. Then
6. result← NOK
7. Break
8. Else Continue
9. End For
10. Output result
Table 2: Authorization Check for Biometric Negative Database
This construction enables us to achieve the following properties.
Proposition 2 Let DB be an (H,m,DB)-biometric negative database.
1. DB is not a negative database of DB.
2. DB enables to check whether a fresh capture b′ is close to one element of
DB by verifying whether all the derived hash chains following Eq. (2) are
not in DB. The error rates of this membership checking operation are:
False ‘Not Member’ Decision
Pfr(1− Pfa)
N−1
False ‘Member’ Decision
1− (1 − Pfa)
N .
Proof.
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1. The first statement comes from the fact that DB is a negative database
of U =
⋃N
k=1DBbk , which is not equivalent to DB, thanks to Proposition
1 (except in the case where p1, p2 are negligible, which corresponds to the
situation where the hash functions are cryptographic ones with hard-to-
find collisions; i.e. the case where almost only original data satisfy the
order m hash equalities).
2. The second statement is induced together by Proposition 1 and Definition
2. The algorithm IsMember
DB
gives a way to decide whether data are in U
from the negative test of presence in DB. Moreover, Proposition 1 implies
that for a genuine user, the probability not to find an order m hash chain
following Eq. (2) in U is approximately
Pfr(1− Pfa)
N−1
(i.e. that you find neither any genuine equalities nor any impostor equal-
ities). Similarly, the probability for an impostor to find an order m hash
chain following Eq. (2) in U is
1− (1− Pfa)
N .
✷
When using the prefix algorithm described in Table 1, or its randomized
variant, the overall size of a biometric negative database is given by the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 The size of an (H,m,DB)-biometric negative database DB obtained
through the prefix algorithm is at most
2×N ×
(
L
m
)
× l2
where l is the length of the binary representation of an order m hash chain as
in Eq. (2). Via its randomized variant, the upper size becomes
2×N ×
(
L
m
)
× l3.
Proof.DB is a negative database of U =
⋃N
k=1DBbk . Each DBbk contains all
order m hash chains obtained for the template bk, i.e. all the m choices of hash
functions among the L from H. The remaining is deduced from the expansion
when the algorithms for negative representation of Section 3 are applied. ✷
When the original database contains N templates of length n, in the deter-
ministic case, the expansion factor is 2×
(
L
m
)
×l2/n and respectively 2×
(
L
m
)
×l3/n
in the randomized case.
Note that although we focus here on the expansion when applying the prefix
algorithms, our concept is compatible with any algorithm for negative represen-
tation generation.
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4.2 Security Discussion
Concerning the confidentiality of the original templates, the choice of an ade-
quate negative database creation algorithm leads to:
Proposition 3 Let DB be an (H,m,DB)-biometric negative database generated
through an algorithm which outputs hard instance for the reconstruction problem
(cf. Section 3).
The knowledge of DB does not allow to retrieve the list of original templates
in DB.
This is straightforward, as by the above assumption, reconstructing U is
hard. Note that even without that reconstructing the original templates might
be a difficult task: if one succeeds in retrieving part of the hash chains of U
from DB, he still has no idea of which hash chains are related to the same orig-
inal template. Nevertheless, one additional advantage on using hard instances,
as already mentioned in Section 3, is the possibility to create several, and un-
linkable, randomized representations. This means that it is possible to have
different biometric negative databases from the same authorization list. For
instance this fits well to access control use cases where the local terminals can
possess the same authorization list, without – thanks to our technique – letting
the possibility to make a direct correlation between them.
Other advantages are implied by these negative representations and their
randomization, it hides the number of data which are negatively represented
and after insertion or deletion of data, applying randomization on a negative
database enables to hide the size variation of the original dataset.
4.3 Operations
On biometric negative databases as defined in Definition 3, we can apply all the
operations available for classical negative databases – see Section 3 – such as the
randomization, insertion, deletion, clean-up, relational algebra, . . ., operations.
Nevertheless all operations on DB have not the same impact with respect to the
original database DB.
In particular, we are interested in the two following operations.
Enrollment of a new user, via a capture bN+1, is straightforward using the
insertion functionality of the negative database for all the hash chains computed
from bN+1.
Revocation of a user is less easy. Due to the property of the biometric neg-
ative database structure, only authorization checks are possible and there is no
way to link different hash chains together. So when using deletion functionality
of negative databases, with respect to a fresh capture b′ which is prior deter-
mined as authorized (i.e. close to a bk for some k), you can only delete the
hash chains found for b′ (i.e. to add in DB the hash chains computed from
b′). Thus this will not suppress all the hash chains related to bk. Moreover,
if the prior authorization corresponds to a False ‘Member’ Decision, then this
revocation would affect other users. This last point is a common problem for
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anonymous membership checks in biometric systems. Concerning the former is-
sue, we suggest to mitigate it by avoiding deletion of database through DB but
by adding a dedicated revocation database (blacklist), which can be represented
in a negative form.
4.4 Variant for Authentication
The Definition 3 leads to the construction of a biometric negative database
for authorization checks purpose. When authentication (1-to-1) is aimed, the
variant below is given.
Definition 4 An (H,m,DB)-biometric negative database for authentication DBauth
is the union of negative representations DBbk of the datasets DBbk (k = 1 . . .N).
More precisely, we defined DBauth as the database containing for all k, the ele-
ments of DBbk with k appended:
DBauth =
N⋃
k=1
[DBbk , k].
Appending k enables to restrict the verification to one sole DBbk . The
associated algorithm for authentication check, with a fresh capture b′ and an
identity claim i, is described in Table 3. Note that this construction can be
used as well for identification use cases where no identity claim is provided by
running comparisons with all elements of DBauth: the list of possible identities
would be the list of index k for which b′ is not detected as member of DBbk .
Input: fresh biometric template b′ and identity claim i
1. result← OK
2. For all 1 ≤ j1 < . . . < jm ≤ L
3. z ← j1|| . . . ||jm||hj1 (b
′)|| . . . ||hjm (b
′)
4. If IsMember
DBbi
(z) = OK
5. Then
6. result← NOK
7. Break
8. Else Continue
9. End For
10. Output result
Table 3: Authentication Check for Biometric Negative Database
Similar to the results explained in Section 4.1, we have:
Lemma 2 Let DBauth be an (H,m,DB)-biometric negative database for au-
thentication.
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• The False Reject Rate of the authentication check (Table 3) is Pfr.
• The False Accept Rate of the authentication check (Table 3) is Pfa.
• When using the randomized variant of the prefix algorithm, the size of
DBauth is
2×N ×
(
L
m
)
× l3.
Note that here, we give only the size with respect to the randomized variant
of the prefix algorithm. We cannot use the deterministic variant as there is no
mixing of the different datasets DBk that would ensure unlinkability of the hash
chains.
Remark 1 This is interesting that the expansion factor in the authorization
scenario is lower or equal to the expansion factor in the authentication scenario.
5 An Example
We describe now the application of our concept to the example of functions used
in [16] for iris identification. The functions used by [16] are L = 128 different
restrictions of the 2048 bits iris vectors to 10 bits.
Let λmin = 0.25 · 2048 = 512, λmax = 0.35 · 2048 = 716.8 be the values
of Condition 1. Then the above family of functions is an (λmin, λmax, p1, p2)-
LSH family, with the probability p1 to obtain the same small proportion for
two iriscodes coming from the same user p1 = (1 −
λmin
2048
)10 ≃ 0.056 and the
probability to obtain the same value for two iriscodes coming from different
users p2 = (1−
λmax
2048
)10 ≃ 0.013.
If we choose a hash chain order m equal to 4, then the binary length of
the hash chains is l = (7 + 10) × 4 = 68 and the error rates are Pfr ≃ 0.066
and Pfa ≃ 0.095. This shows the interest of using hash chains. This choice
of parameteres is valuable for authentication use case. This needs still to be
improved to be efficient for authorization use case with medium scale databases.
According to Lemma 1, the upper bound for expansion factors when using
the deterministic prefix algorithm will be about 225.5 and about 231.6 with the
randomized prefix algorithm.
As an even more practical example, if we take the order m equal to 3 –
which is the threshold used in [16] for determination of candidates in an iris
identification scenario – and N = 100 enrolled iriscodes from different users,
then it leads to an overall biometric negative database of about 20 Go.
6 Conclusion
This paper introduces the notion of negative database for biometric data. While
the concept of negative database has been introduced in 2004, our proposal is
the first one, as far as we know on this very subject. Although the storage of
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biometric data seems a natural field of application for this concept of negative
database, one should understand that what make our work possible are the prior
researches on the quantization of biometric. Indeed, our contribution exploits
the simpler matching algorithm that this quantization permits. This is not the
first time that this new matching algorithms raise results. For instance, beyond
their own interest as an alternative to traditional matching algorithms, they are
currently considered as a part of the solution for biometric identification in a
encrypted way [4].
We believe that our scheme can still be optimized. For example, we directly
store in the positive databaseDB the biometric data taken during the enrollment
phase. Whereas, we are interested in the whole Hamming ball of radius λmin.
A clever representation of biometric data should lead to more compact positive
database and negative database.
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